Lactantius
A Treatise on the Anger of God
Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion
「c240-320」, Lactantius A Treatise on the Anger of God in vol. 2 of Works of Lactantius, together with the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and Fragments of the Second and Third Century, in Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325, ed. Rev. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Edinburgh, 1871;Google Books: Online Library of Free eBooks).
Though philosophers have often turned aside from reason through their ignorance of the truth, and have fallen into inextricable errors (for that is wont to happen to these which happens to a traveller ignorant of the way, and not confessing that he is ignorant,—namely, that he wanders about, while he is ashamed to inquire from those who he meet), no philosopher, however, has ever made the assertion that there is no difference between man and the brutes. Nor has any one at all, provided that he wished to appear wise, reduced a rational animal to the level of the mute and irrational; which some ignorant persons do, resembling the brute themselves, who, wishing to give themselves up to the indulgence of their appetite and pleasure, say that they are born on the same principle as all living animals, which it is impious for man to say.
…And on this account there is no animal, as Cicero says, except man, which has any knowledge of God. For he alone is furnished with wisdom, so that he alone understands religion; and this is the chief or only difference between man and the dumb animals. For the other things which appear to be peculiar to man, even if there are not such in the dumb animals, nevertheless may appear to be similar. Speech is peculiar to man; yet even in these there is a certain resemblance to speech, for they both distinguish one another by their voices; and when they are angry, they send forth a sound resembling altercation; and when they see one another after an interval of time, they show the office of congratulation by their voice. To us, indeed, their voices appear uncouth, as our perhaps do to them; but to themselves, who understand one another, they are words. In short, in every affection they utter distinct expressions of voice by which they may show their sate of mind. Laughter also is peculiar to man; an yet we see certain indications of joy in other animals, when they use passionate gestures with a view to sports, hang down their ears, contract their mouth, smooth their forehead, relax their eyes to sportiveness. What is so peculiar to man as reason and the foreseeing of the future? but here are animals which open several outlets in different directions from their lairs, that if any danger come upon them, an escape may be open for them shut in; but they would not do this unless they possessed intelligence and reflection. Others are provident for the future, as “ants, when they plunder a great heap of corn, mindful of the winter, and lay it up in their dwelling;” and mindfull of the winter which is to come, they practise labour in the summer, and lay up their gains as a common stock.”
…It would be a long task if I should wish to trace out the things most resembling the skill of man, which are accustomed to be done by the separate tribes of animals. But it, in the case of all these things which are wont to be ascribed to man, there is found to be some resemblances even in the dumb animals, it is evident that religion is the only thing of which there is not trace can be found in the dumb animals, nor any indication. For justice is peculiar to religion, and to this not other animal attains. For man alone bears rule; the other animals are subjected to him. But the worship of God is ascribed to justice; and he who does not embrace this, being far removed from the nature of man, will live the life of the brutes under the form of man. But since we differ from the other animals almost in this respect alone, that we alone of all perceive the divine might and power, while in the others there is not understanding of God, it is surely impossible that in this respect either the dumb animals should have more wisdom, or human nature should be unwise, since all living creatures, and the whole system of nature, are subject to man on account of his wisdom. wherefore if reason, if the force of man in this respect, excels man, surpasses the rest of living creatures, inasmuch as he alone is capable to the knowledge of God, it is evident that religion can in no way be overthrown. (9-11)
